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     Introduction
The EU-Russia relationship is of key strategic economic and security
importance for both parties. Senior Russian figures argue that despite the
uncertainty of the EU’s military and political prospects, economic inte-
gration processes are now irreversible, making it one of the important
poles of power in international politics.1 The importance of the EU as
Russia’s “biggest partner” was again stated by President Vladimir Putin
in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006.2 Russia
receives significant quantities of funding from the EU to aid its political
and economic transformation – the EU has provided some 2.6 billion
euros since 1991,3 and the EU is Russia’s main export market. Indeed, the
EU energy market has essentially supported Russian economic growth –
as one gas expert has argued, “the financial significance of exports to
Europe for both Gazprom as a company, and Russia as a country, can
scarcely be overestimated”.4
Moreover, if some prominent Russians are dismissive of the EU’s capa-
bility as a coherent political actor with significant prospects as a mili-
tary actor, there is some awareness amongst the Russian elite of the EU’s
greater activity in south eastern Europe and the Caucasus and the neg-
ative impact this may have on Russian interests. Equally, some leading
experts have argued that EU enlargement – and more active involve-
ment in these areas – effectively isolates Russia more than does NATO
enlargement, and in consequence poses serious challenges to Russia’s
security.
1 Yevgeniy Primakov, “Russia and the U.S. in Need of Trust and Transparency”, Russia
in Global Affairs, no. 1, January–March (2006) (online 26 Feb 2007). Unless a speci-
fic date is noted, all online references were last checked 26 February–1 March 2007.
Complete URL addresses are listed in the bibliography.
2 Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”, 10 May 2006, Federal
News Service (online).
3 Tomila Lankina, “Explaining European Union Aid to Russia”, Post-Soviet Affairs, vol.
21, no. 4. (2005): 309.
4 John Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p. 127;
Andrew Monaghan, Russian Oil and EU Energy Security, CSRC paper 05/65 (Swindon:
Conflict Studies Research Centre, November 2005).
8 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007For the EU, Russia is a major market for its goods and is an important
energy supplier, both as a producer and as an alternative source of oil facil-
itating energy security through source diversity. Additionally, Russia is
an important partner in international peace and security, as an influential
actor both on the United Nations Security Council and in the newly inde-
pendent states of the former Soviet Union. The EU therefore has an
“important strategic and economic interest in Russia’s development”.5
Russia, the EU’s largest neighbour, is brought closer by the EU’s enlarge-
ment. This emphasises the fact that Russia is also a source of a number of
security challenges for the EU, including environmental pollution and
degradation, organised crime and illegal migration and the potential for
spill-over consequences from the conflict in Chechnya and the wider Cau-
casus region.6
This study examines the relationship between these partners. It is one
which has evolved significantly since the early 1990s, seeing periods of
progress and stagnation, partnership and friction. My focus is on the secu-
rity dimension of the relationship. Security here is broadly understood to
include both “hard”, military security and less tangible “soft” security
issues such as environmental degradation, organised crime, health and
diseases and illegal migration. The scale and exact nature of many of these
problems are neither self-evident nor easy to gauge: organised crime, for
instance, is not a self-publicising business. Moreover, soft security threats
cannot be eliminated entirely, merely reduced to tolerable levels. 
Although the economic side of the relationship has tended to dominate
any analysis, security, in this broad sense, in fact pervades EU-Russia rela-
tions and is becoming ever more important. In the early 1990s, security
discussions tended to focus on broad international issues such as the Mid-
dle East and specific soft security projects in Russia. The key political aim
was to establish a Europe without dividing lines. Plans for more specific
security cooperation have been laid and a bureaucratic structure estab-
lished to facilitate such plans. However, the enlargement of the EU –
symbolically enough referred to as “expansion” in Russia – and the EU’s
increased focus on values has made the security relationship more com-
plex, and concerns have been expressed in Russia that such changes are
indeed creating dividing lines.
5 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on relations with Russia, COM (2004) 106 09/02/04 (online). 
6 Russian Federation, EU Country Strategy Paper, 2002–2006, National Indicative Pro-
gramme, 2002–3, December 2001, p. 1.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 9Moreover, apparently common interests, such as managing the borders
and cooperating against organised crime, have of course become more
prominent with the growth of the common border. The EU’s enlarge-
ment has also created a common neighbourhood in which there are a
number of ongoing “frozen” conflicts in which both sides have clear inter-
ests. Yet, as this study will show, these interests of Russia and the EU do
not always coincide.
The study is in two main parts. First, it establishes the broad background
of the relationship, outlining the key features of its evolution through the
1990s to the end of 2006. In this first part, the paper first examines the
establishment of the relationship, looking first at its structure and the
nature of the key documents. Following this, the paper highlights the
state of the relationship by 2004–2005, examining the nature of the
political problems and assessing the reasons behind the lack of practical
progress in the relationship. The second main part of the paper is devoted
to developments since 2005 and the nature of the strategic partnership,
examining first some of the achievements in the relationship, such as the
improvements in the dialogue and decision-making structures before
turning to examine ongoing problems, particularly differences over prin-
ciples and interests.
The key point that emerges is the tension between slow but important
progress in establishing a closer bureaucratic relationship with new plans
and frameworks for cooperation, and what amounts to a series of principle
differences on key political issues. Simply, not only is there a well known
difference in “values”, but political and security interests also often conflict.
Furthermore, despite the strategic importance of the relationship, both
sides have many other priorities to which to attend, and although there
are those who seek to enhance and improve the relationship, there are
many who do not consider the further positive development of the rela-
tionship to be in their interests.

Chapter 1The Background
 of EU-Russia Relations
Building the Relationship
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed in 1994,7
after nearly two years of preparation with eight rounds of negotiations and
many informal meetings.8 The PCA did not assert a strategic partnership,
neither did it aim to found an association between Russia and the EU, nor
seek to prepare for Russia’s (long-term) entry into it.
Nonetheless it was a key document, since it established the institutional
framework for bilateral relations. First, it founded the legal basis for a
broad economic and political relationship. Second, it established the
political framework of biannual presidential summits, annual Coopera-
tion Council meetings at ministerial level, biannual meetings of a Coop-
eration Committee of senior officials, nine sub-committees and parlia-
mentary-level meetings. Third, the PCA set out common objectives in
trade and economic cooperation, science and technology, the environ-
ment, transport, space technology, justice and home affairs (JHA) and
political dialogue for a period of ten years after its coming into force.
The document was heavily focused on economic and trade technicalities,
but importantly the PCA was also based on core principles shared by the
7 The text of the document can be found on European Commission, The European Com-
mission’s delegation to Russia (online).
8 For background literature on the development of the relationship during the 1990s,
see Hiski Haukkala and Sergei Medvedev, eds, The EU Common Strategy on Russia:
Learning the Grammar of the CFSP. (Helsinki: FIIA, 2001); Marius Vahl, “Just Good
Friends? The EU-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’ and the Northern Dimension”, Cen-
tre for European Policy Studies Working Document no. 166. (Brussels: Centre for
European Policy Studies, 2001); Yuri Borko and Olga Buturina, eds., Evropeiskii soyuz
na poroge XXI veka. Vuibor strategii razvitia [The European Union on the Threshold of
the 21st Century: Choice of Strategic Development] (Moscow: URSS, 2001); Andrei
Zagorski, “Policies Towards Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus”, in Roland
Dannreuther, ed., European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood
Strategy. (London: Routledge, 2004).
12 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007parties, ranging from the promotion of international peace and security to
support for a democratic society based on political and economic
freedoms. It sought to create a spirit of equality and partnership between
the EU and Russia and strengthen political, commercial, economic and
cultural ties: in effect to establish a stable, democratic Europe without
dividing lines.
These were heady aims, given that – or perhaps because of the fact that –
the Cold War had just ended. They were all the more so because of diver-
gences over many of these “core common principles”, illustrated by disa-
greement over Russia’s brutal handling of its Chechen problem.9 Indeed,
partly as a result of EU sanctions directed against Russian actions in
Chechnya, the PCA did not come into force until 1997.10 Such problems
and other drawbacks – security, apart from a small number of clauses
addressing soft security, is not explicitly addressed in the PCA, for exam-
ple, and some of the economic clauses were out of date before the PCA
even came into force – limited the long-term practical value of the docu-
ment.
Nonetheless, the key point was not that it should be a panacea for all the
difficulties in the relationship. Indeed, that a document had been agreed
upon at all to begin to overcome the Cold War confrontation between the
parties was an important sign of progress according to senior Russian
experts.11 Moreover, although the PCA was flawed it has served as the
foundation for other agreements and plans that have developed the basic
agreements significantly. One example of this was the planning and
establishing of the Northern Dimension Project which included a
number of soft security projects.
The Northern Dimension Project resulted from a Finnish proposal in
1997 which sought to emphasise the regional and local interdependence
between north European states and draw the attention of the whole EU to
the challenges and opportunities posed by Russia. It was implemented
within the framework of the PCA and sought to highlight the primacy of
soft security challenges and the role of multilateral cooperation in resolv-
ing them. Russia approached the project in a positive fashion, since it was
9 For expert detailed analysis of the two Chechen wars and Russian policies in the
North Caucasus, see the papers by Charles Blandy for the Conflict Studies Research
Centre [Defence Academy of the UK (online)]. 
10 Nonetheless, an Interim Agreement was signed in June 1995 to facilitate practical
cooperation, becoming operational in February 1996, bringing into force most of the
economic sections.
11 Interviews with Vladimir Shemyatenkov, former Soviet Ambassador to the European
Communities, Moscow, October 2004 and Russian parliamentarian, Moscow, Octo-
ber 2005
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 13the only cooperative forum in which Russia was represented as an equal.
Indeed, a particular emphasis was placed on ensuring the active participa-
tion of all involved, including regional organizations, local and regional
authorities, the academic and business communities, and civil society.
Cooperative activities include border control improvements, nuclear
facilities management, cooperation to address the problem of communi-
cable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and protection of the natural environ-
ment.12
Although EU-Russia dialogue was ongoing in regular high-level meet-
ings, the next major steps which were built on the foundations laid out
by the PCA were the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (CSR) of June
1999, the EU’s first attempt to formulate such a common strategy plan
for a relationship with a state that did not seek membership, and Russia’s
Mid-Term Strategy on Relations with the EU, 2000–2010 (MTS),13 the
first such plan for relations with a third party proclaimed by the Russian
government. The strategies were to elaborate more effectively and coher-
ently the objectives in the relationship and the instruments to be used.
The PCA remained the central document on which relations were
founded, since it provided the legal basis and political framework for the
relationship. But, in attempting to build on this foundation and focus the
interests of each side for the development of the relationship, these two
documents were held by some effectively to represent the “starting point”
in relations,14 and reflect the importance the two sides attached to close
political and economic cooperation.15 According to Igor Ivanov, then
Russian Foreign Minister, the CSR and MTS were two strategies “coming
to meet” and contributing to “consistent development of the all-Euro-
pean integration processes and joint efforts … to overcome contemporary
threats”.16 This new strategic horizon for the relationship sought to pro-
vide for greater stability in Europe and cooperation in responding to chal-
lenges, particularly by consolidating and improving the mechanisms for
dialogue, integration of Russia into a common economic space and con-
solidation of political and social transformation in Russia.17
12 See European Commission, European Union External Relations (online 16 Aug 2006).
13 English language versions of the texts of both documents can be found on the web
site The European Commission’s delegation to Russia.
14 Dov Lynch, “Struggling with an Indispensable Partner”, in What Russia Sees, ed. Dov
Lynch, Chaillot Paper no. 74 (January 2005) [Institute for Security Studies, European
Union (online)], p. 115.
15 Yuri Borko, “Otnoshenia Rossii s Evropeiskim soyuzom: tekushchie problemy i dal-
nie gorizonty”, in Evropeiskii soyuz, eds Yuri Borko and Olga Buturina.
16 Igor Ivanov cited in Yuri Borko, “The EU’s CSR: A Russian View”, in The EU Com-
mon Strategy on Russia, eds Haukkala and Medvedev, p. 121.
17 Lynch, “Struggling with an Indispensable Partner”, pp. 120–3.
14 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007Putin’s attendance at the EU Council Summit in March 2001, and his
role in defining its agenda, again reflected the improvement in relations
and were deemed by one Russian expert to be a “remarkable innovation”.
Noting that the EU did not normally extend summit invitations to lead-
ers of non-member states, Vladimir Baranovsky, Deputy Director of
IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and International Relations) in
Moscow, pointed out that “observers … considered it reflective of the ris-
ing character of Russia’s relations with the EU” and indicative of the EU’s
“deliberate intention … to highlight Russia’s role as its partner”.18
Within the framework of the CSR and MTS strategies, military security
began to take a higher profile, illustrated by the October 2001 EU-Russia
Summit and the subsequent Joint Declaration on Stepping Up Dialogue
and Cooperation on Political and Security Matters.19 This declaration
underlined political progress being made through an increasingly broad
spectrum of discussions and the dense nature of diplomatic links. Stipu-
lating the necessity to exploit existing links as much as possible, it also
established monthly meetings between a Russian representative and the
EU’s Political and Security Committee (COPS)20 to discuss crisis preven-
tion and management. The first military steps were taken on 29 May
2002, at a meeting between the EU’s General Gustav Heglund and Rus-
sian Chief of General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin. The major result of the
meeting was the decision to dispatch a representative of the Russian Min-
istry of Defence to Brussels to sustain operative communications between
Russia and the EU. Other issues, such as the prospects for Russia-EU
cooperation in the military and military technical spheres, cooperation
between the fleets of Russia and the EU and the possibility of joint con-
duct of peacekeeping operations were also discussed. Arrangements for
possible Russian participation in crisis-management operations of a civil-
ian and military nature would be developed according to progress made
in the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Russia also agreed
to contribute to the EU’s Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
agreements were reached to exchange information on terrorist activities
and groups and discussions about cooperation on civilian defence and
emergency management.21 Additionally, the EU agreed to fund bilateral
18 Vladimir Baranovsky, Russia’s Attitudes Towards the European Union: Foreign and Security
Policy Aspects (Helsinki: FIIA, 2002), p. 62.
19 Diplomaticheski Vestnik, no. 11 (2001), pp. 23–4.
20 COPS is the main organ for coordinating decision-making in ESDP, consisting of a
committee of appointed ambassadors from member states.
21 For further discussion of this, see Andrew Monaghan, Russian Perspectives of Russia-EU
Security Relations, CSRC Document, 05/38 (Camberley: Conflict Studies Research
Centre, 2005).
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 15mine-clearing cooperation, such as the Russo-Swedish project to clear
World War II mines from the Baltic around the Kaliningrad region.22
Further steps were taken in 2003, with plans laid at the St Petersburg
Summit to develop Four Common Spaces as an umbrella for the devel-
opment of the relationship. The “Common Spaces” idea – and the sub-
sequently agreed Four Spaces Road Maps signed in 2005 – have been
criticised for being vague and ambiguous, as discussed below.23 Indeed,
even the term “Space” itself is rather unclear and intangible. Nonethe-
less, officials on both sides have noted that it was an attempt to charac-
terise broadly the important elements of the relationship into four main
groups and set out lists of tasks, projects and requirements within these
areas for cooperation. If this is dismissed as diplomatic speak by analysts
on both sides, it nevertheless underlines two basic but still important
points. First, there is of course a need to come to agreement – a need
which highly specific language often blocks, particularly between two
such different parties as the EU and Russia. Second, the EU-Russia
agenda itself is vast, encompassing many dimensions. This very breadth
has served to confuse the agenda and priorities, which has in conse-
quence undermined progress.
Moreover, the development of the Four Spaces clearly illustrated the more
balanced approach being adopted by the two sides between the different
dimensions in the relationship. The official and practical agendas were no
longer largely being dominated by economic issues, as had been the case
in the PCA. Economics and trade were of course still of great importance.
But two of the four spaces were dedicated to security, one to external secu-
rity issues and one to freedom, justice and security (JHA), outlining a
broad agenda for cooperation.
The structure of the relationship was also to be redefined, with the estab-
lishment of Permanent Partnership Councils (PPCs), which would
replace the Cooperation Committees and intensify cooperation with Rus-
sian ministries and engage the Presidential Administration. The PPC
would offer “all the flexibility and engagement Russia seeks, while main-
taining EU coherence and transparency”.24 The Russians had argued that
the Cooperation Committees were obsolete and not working well,
although the EU considered that they still had potential, despite their
22 Capt. V. Sulzhenko, “Ministr Oborony Shvetsii – na Baltike” [Sweden’s Defence
Minister is visiting the Baltic], Morskoi Sbornik, no. 6 (2002): 10.
23 The Four Common Spaces include economics, freedom, security and justice, external
security and research, education and culture.
24 European Commission, Communication from the Commission …, p. 5.
16 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007essentially bureaucratic nature. Without Russian cooperation, however –
the Russians simply did not turn up to meetings from 2003 onwards,
according to one expert – the Councils became ineffective.25
If there were successes, there were also flaws. The CSR and MTS docu-
ments reiterated that progress in a number of areas had been slow, partic-
ularly Russian entry into the WTO, the elimination of trade discrimina-
tion and improvement in the efficiency of political dialogue. Second,
analysts pointed to the problematic tone of the documents. Yuri Borko,
of the Institute of Europe, discerned that regardless of official pronounce-
ments, the CSR/MTS documents were of a “contradictory character as far
as some perceptions, approaches and concrete aims” were concerned.26
Dov Lynch, Senior Research fellow at the EU’s Institute for Security Stud-
ies, argued that the CSR was “at once condescending and vapid”, and the
list of actions to be fulfilled by Russia is “quite dizzying”. The EU’s
approach resembled the heavily conditional and interventionist style it
developed with candidates for accession. But since Russia was not a can-
didate for membership, there was a tension between the comprehensive
demands being made and the limited endgame envisaged for relations.27
Moreover, although acknowledging the CSR and that it was “possible and
desirable to join the efforts of the parties to achieve the objectives of these
two documents”, the MTS was Russia’s strategy towards the EU, rather
than any agreement between two parties. Indeed, the MTS hardly refers
to the CSR. Only twice does it respond directly. First, it acknowledges
and takes the CSR into account. Second, it is linked with the idea of con-
cluding, at some stage in the future, a new Russia-EU agreement on stra-
tegic partnership and cooperation, advancing towards it “gradually”.28
The two documents reflected conceptual differences in the relationship:
the two partners are different types of “actor”. One was an independent
state seeking to rebuild itself and enhance its independence as a global
power, the other a multi-national, supra-national institution that has
been fifty years (at least) in the making. One was a comparatively poor
state, burdened with many hangovers from the collapse of a different
political and economic system, the other a rich “paradise” at a completely
different stage of evolution, and more able to pick and choose its priori-
25 Interviews with EU officials in Moscow and Brussels, spring and summer 2006.
26 Yuri Borko, ‘EU/Russia Cooperation: The Moscow Perpsective’, in The EU and Kali-
ningrad: Kaliningrad and the Impact of EU Enlargement, eds James Baxendale, Stephen
Dewar and David Gowan (London: Federal Trust, 2000), p. 64.
27 Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper, no. 60 (May 2003) [Institute for Secu-
rity Studies (online)], p. 57.
28 Cited in Borko, “Otnoshenia Rossii s Evropeiskim soyuzom …”, pp. 381, 384.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 17ties. This had an impact on the relationship since both sides were seen to
speak different languages, especially on such topics as state sovereignty
and human rights. These conceptual problems have had an enduring and
real impact on the relationship: Moscow’s unwillingness to integrate into
Europe reflected in the MTS was, according to Arkadii Moshes, Director
of the Russia-EU program at the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs, part of the reason that relations began to slide after 2002.29
Moreover, Russia sought a relationship and partnership based on equality
– but without integration. The notion of equality was a main feature of
the MTS, posing Russia as the hub of the NIS (Newly Independent
States) region. Russia’s status as a world power was reiterated, and it was
“from this point of view” that “joint efforts” would be conducted. The
document made clear that Russia did not officially seek to join the EU,
nor become an associate member. However, it was clearly not an equal
partner in many dimensions of the relationship. In fact, according to
Nikolai Kaveshnikov of the Institute of Europe in Moscow, the “principal
stumbling block” in EU-Russia relations was the “contradiction between
Russia’s unreal claims for overall equality and the EU’s desire to integrate
Russia on a different basis”.30
The negotiations to prepare the Four Common Spaces were also pro-
tracted and difficult, reflecting the practical impact of these conceptual
issues. Russia criticised the EU’s “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A
New Framework For Relations With Our Eastern and Southern Neigh-
bours” policy on the grounds that it would create just one pole in Europe,
centring on Brussels and acting as a gravitational centre drawing influ-
ence away from Russia and undermining the NIS. Russian officials
argued that the Wider Europe concept was flawed since it reduced to the
lowest common denominator groups of states at different stages of devel-
opment and which had different objectives with regard to their relations
with the EU. There were also concerns that it demarcated and consoli-
dated the EU’s external borders as a natural limit to the spread of integra-
tional processes. Russia acted therefore to maintain its own separate stra-
tegic partnership with the EU, and refrained from involvement in the
Wider Europe project. It also worked on the assumption that the concept
should not contravene either agreements with the EU or the integration
processes in the NIS.31
29 Arkady Moshes, “Reaffirming the Benefits of Russia’s European Choice”, Russia in
Global Affairs, no. 3 (July–September 2005) (online).
30 Nikolai Kaveshnikov, EU-Russia Relations: How to Overcome the Deadlock of Mutual Mis-
understanding? IEE Document, no. 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d’Etudes Euro-
peenes, 2003), pp. 4–5.
18 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007These concerns led to the search for an alternative. However, Russian offi-
cials were unable to present one. With just three weeks remaining until
the St Petersburg summit of 2003, neither side knew what to propose,
one expert argued. The Four Spaces proposals began, therefore, as an
empty arrangement, the result of three weeks hasty preparation.32 And
plans remained hollow and lacking in substance, not least because Russia
did not have a clearly formulated policy towards the EU beyond the asser-
tion that Russia did not seek EU membership: an inadequate position,
leading Russian analysts argued, for developing a realistic action plan and
strategic agenda.33
Indeed, following the relative optimism of 2000–2001, frustration with
the failure to develop coherent plans for the strategic development of the
relationship, or even to convert existing ones into practical substance set
in. There was little progress in establishing the military cooperation
planned and even larger-scale projects such as the Northern Dimension
Project failed to make headway, despite enjoying support from both sides.
Between 2002 and 2004, there was also an apparent decline in Technical
Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) project activ-
ity, according to one analyst.34 TACIS was launched in 1991 to provide
grant-financed technical assistance to twelve states of the former Soviet
Union, mainly to assist and enhance the transitional process. This
includes support for legal, administrative and institutional reform, sup-
port for the private sector, development of infrastructure networks and
the rural economy, and enhancement of environmental protection and the
management of natural resources.35
Political Problems
Commentators therefore began to argue that the relationship was stuck in
a “vicious circle” with no clear strategy and a growing number of prob-
lems.36 Another Russian expert considered there to be a “systemic crisis”
in the relationship, largely brought about because of a lack of strategic
aims in the relationship – the absence of which meant that practical issues
31 Vladimir Chizhov, “European Union: A Partnership Strategy”, International Affairs,
Moscow, no. 6 (2004).
32 Interview with Russian official, October 2004.
33 Sergei Karaganov, Timofei Bordachyov, Vagif Guseynov, Fyodor Lukyanov and
Dmitri Suslov, Russia-EU Relations: the Present Situation and Prospects, CEPS working
document, no. 225, July 2005, p. 3.
34 Lankina, “Explaining European …”: 317.
35 See “The EU’s relations with Eastern Europe & Central Asia”, European Union External
Relations, [European Commission (online 16 Aug 2006)].
36 Igor Leshoukov, “Can the Northern Dimension Break the Vicious Circle of Russia-
EU Relations?’, in The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU? ed. Hanna Ojanen (Hel-
sinki: UPI, 2001), p. 119.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 19turned into “insurmountable obstacles bordering on crises”.37 Other Rus-
sian experts noted that the balance sheet of EU-Russia relations in 2004
was “devastating”, with no large-scale cooperation programme producing
success.38 Vladimir Lukin, Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, thus
stated that in 2004 relations between Russia and the EU were disappoint-
ing and leading to a dead end; progress that could have been expected in
2000 had “turned out to be impossible”.39 Analysts on the EU side also
argued that relations had evolved from being “friction-prone to fric-
tional”,40 and that little had been achieved.41 Official EU concern with the
lack of progress was also clear – in February 2004, the European Commis-
sion noted that despite ambitious political declarations, developed strat-
egies for relations and “certain steps forward”, there was “insufficient
overall progress on substance” and an “increasing strain” in relations.42
Old problems, such as disagreements over Russia’s handling of Chechnya
and the North Caucasus also remained prominent. The renewed hostili-
ties in Dagestan and Chechnya in 1999 and 2000 fuelled concerns in the
EU that Russia was moving away from its democratic transition and the
values espoused by the Union. The EU accepted neither Russia’s claims
that Chechnya formed part of the struggle against international terrorism
nor Russia’s robust methods. The Chechen issue arose again in 2002,
when Moscow reacted angrily to Denmark holding the World Chechen
Congress, with Putin’s objections leading to the summit being moved
from Copenhagen to Brussels. Indeed, perhaps the most surprising point
about the 2002 summit was that it took place, commented one analyst.43
Then the two sides clashed following the Beslan terrorist attack in 2004,
when Russian officials reacted angrily to EU questions about the han-
dling of the hostage crisis.44
New difficulties also took a high profile, particularly concerning the
enlargement of the EU in 2004, having a double impact on the relation-
37 Nadezhda Arbatova in Boris Piadyshev, ed., “New Geopolitics for Russia”, Internatio-
nal Affairs, Moscow, no. 4 (2005).
38 “Russia: Quo Vadis?” Symposium at EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 5 April
2004.
39 Vladimir Lukin in Boris Piadyshev, ed., “In 2004, Russian Foreign Policy Moved
Ahead Cementing its Achievements and Never Losing Initiative”, International
Affairs, Moscow, no. 1 (2005). 
40 Lynch, “Struggling with an Indispensable Partner”, p. 119.
41 Charlotte Wagnsson, “The Alien and the Traditional: The EU Facing a Transforming
Russia”, in Changing Transatlantic Security Relations. Do the US, the EU and Russia Form
a New Strategic Triangle?, eds Jan Hallenberg and Hakan Karlsson (London: Rout-
ledge, 2006).
42 European Commission, Communication from the Commission …, pp. 2–3.
43 “EU-Russia Summit: The Real Score”, Inside Russia and Eurasia, 12 November 2002
(online).
44 Lynch, “Struggling with an Indispensable Partner”, p. 118.
20 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007ship. Although many Russians argue that Russia does not oppose enlarge-
ment, concerns that the EU would not take Russian interests into account
and that it would create new dividing lines in Europe were clear. On the
one hand, enlargement brought economic advantages to Russia, intro-
ducing a single EU customs tariff and the lifting of non-tariff restrictions.
On the other, it led to visa restrictions on travel between Russia and the
Kaliningrad exclave and the implementation of tougher trade regulations
for Russia in relation to its traditional trading partners in Central and
Eastern Europe – estimated by some to result in a potential loss to Russia
of US$ 120–150 billion.45
Although agreement was reached on Russian concerns (reflected in the
Joint Statement on the Enlargement of the EU and Russia-European
Relations, adopted on 27 April 2004), the process was fraught. As Kosa-
chov pointed out, one of the “downs” in EU-Russia relations was due to
the initially harsh response from Brussels to Moscow’s list of concerns
about enlargement.46 Moreover, negotiations on Russian travel and visa
restrictions remained difficult to resolve.
Enlargement highlighted the lack of consensus on a number of issues in
the new, common neighbourhood. In fact a number of Russian experts
argued that the EU was becoming increasingly aggressive towards Russia,
and that its proposals for cooperation with Russia’s border areas made it
a rival to Moscow in Russia’s inner space, competing for markets and eco-
nomic channels.47 Such a view was espoused by Vladimir Chizhov, then
Deputy Foreign Minister, who argued that the EU enlargement “is a far
more serious and far-reaching challenge to Russia than even the expansion
of NATO, among other things because we are … competitors in some
spheres of trade and economic relations”.48 Thus Lynch commented that
following the terrorist attack on Beslan, Russian relations with the EU
had seemed to reach an “unprecedented low” – but actually the crisis over
the Ukrainian elections in December 2004, during which Moscow and
Brussels espoused polar opposite views, showed that things could deteri-
orate still further.49
45 See also discussions of Mikhail Kokeev, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and
Mikhail Kamynin, Director, Press and Information Department, MID, in Boris Pia-
dyshev, ed., “2005: Fewer Illusions, More Realism”, International Affairs, Moscow, no.
1 (2006); On the Eve of Finland’s Presidency in the EU, Rossiyskiy Vektor – Information-
Analytical Bulletin, no. 4 (Moscow: Russian Institute for Strategic Studies 2005), p.
3.
46 Kosachov in Boris Piadyshev, ed., “In 2004, Russian Foreign Policy …”
47 Karaganov et al, Russia-EU relations, p. 7.
48 Chizhov, “European Union”.
49 Dov Lynch, “Misperceptions and Divergences”, in What Russia Sees, ed. Dov Lynch,
pp. 7–8.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 21If political differences hindered the positive development of relations, two
other sets of problems underlay many of the difficulties. First, the
resources dedicated to cooperative projects were limited. If the framework
existed for projects to develop, such as those in cooperative threat reduc-
tion activities, one study found that the main improvement necessary was
an increase in funds.50 Igor Ivanov also doubted whether projects such as
the Northern Dimension Project were feasible on such a limited resource
base.51 Russian analysts noted the small Russian federal budget allocation
to resolving soft security issues, since Russia faced serious economic and
financial constraints.52 Political willingness to assist in nuclear clean-up
was plainly greater than the ability to implement the projects.53 Russia
simply could not be actively involved in projects such as the Northern
Dimension because of the financial situation in Russia. Moreover, exist-
ing resources were inefficiently used. Aleksandr Gusakov, head of the
information department of the Severodvinsk municipal administration,
believed that the allocation of funds by the EU and effective spending of
the resources already issued would make it possible to modernise existing
storage facilities.54
Decision-making Problems
Problems also lay in the decision-making processes in the relationship
itself and on each side. The PPC, introduced in May 2003 to enhance the
effectiveness of the relationship, did not meet until 27 April 2004 because
of disagreements over the desired format of the meetings. Moscow wanted
to involve all the member states in a 25+1 format (i.e. plus Russia),
whereas the EU sought to keep an open troika arrangement, which
included relevant representatives from Russia, the representatives of the
current and subsequent Presidents of the European Council, Council Sec-
retariat and European Commission.
Neither were the partners often ready for mutually beneficial cooperation,
especially in civil emergency management and military cooperation. The
50 Burkard Schmitt, ed., EU Cooperative Threat Reduction Activities in Russia, Chaillot
paper, no. 61 (Paris: ISS, June 2003), p. 50.
51 Igor Ivanov, Diplomaticheski Vestnik, no. 12 (1999), p. 9.
52 Leshoukov in The Northern Dimension, p.133; Nikita Lomagin, “Soft security pro-
blems in Northwest Russia”, Russian Regional Perspectives, vol. 1, no. 1 [Institute of
International and Strategic Studies (online)].
53 Nils Bøhmer, Aleksandr Nikitin, Igor Kudrik, Thomas Nilson, Michael McGovern
and Andrei Zolotkov, Atomnaya Arktika [The Arctic Nuclear Challenge], Bellona
Foundation Report, vol. 3 (2001) [Bellona Russian edition (online)].
54 Alexandr Gusakov, “Regional Cooperation in the Sphere of Nuclear Safety: A Case
Study of the Dismantling of Nuclear Submarines at Severodvinsk Shipyards”, Russian
Regional Perspectives, vol. 1, no. 1 [Institute of International and Strategic Studies
(online)].
22 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007EU did not have the capabilities to respond to Russian proposals, for
example to establish a centre to coordinate civil emergency management,
and the Russian military needed doctrinal and organisational overhaul
before meaningful cooperation could be implemented.55
The complexity of the EU’s bureaucratic system slowed planning and
implementation. Moreover, EU policy was fragmented. This was recog-
nised officially in 2004 in the reports on EU-Russia relations issued by
the European Parliament, Commission and Council which all emphasised
the need for greater EU unity in dealing with Russia. “There is a clear
need for increased EU coordination and coherence across all areas of EU
activity – sending clear, unambiguous messages to Russia”, noted the
Commission.56
On the Russian side, there was little capacity to formulate and imple-
ment effective policy towards the EU. Until 2003–2004, the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Innostrannykh Del’: MID)
had very limited resources for engaging the EU effectively, either in
Moscow or in Brussels. According to leading Russian experts, the
administrative machinery for implementing Russia’s EU policy was
therefore not prepared for the task, being organisationally disunited and
with too few qualified personnel to deal with the powerful bureaucratic
machinery of Brussels. Russia thus lacked the resources to prepare its
own drafts for joint documents, and consequently the EU was dominat-
ing the drafting of agreements and documents and taking the decision-
making processes under its control.57 As discussed below, and partly as
a result of these problems, the MID has also lacked the political weight
in Russian decision-making to coordinate other ministries effectively.
Moreover, coordinated links between official bodies and non-official
expertise were lacking. Konstantin Kosachov, Chairman of the State
Duma’s Committee for International Affairs, noted that in 2004 joint
activities involving representatives of the power structures, scientists,
political analysts and experts in international affairs were of a “non-sys-
temic, spontaneous nature … mostly confined to personal contacts”. It
was imperative to establish powerful non-governmental think tanks and
effective interaction between officialdom and the scientific community to
provide impartial analysis of key decisions and prepare independent pro-
posals, he argued.58
55 Monaghan, Russian perspectives of Russia-EU security relations, pp. 4–5.
56 European Commission, Communication from the Commission …, emphasis added.
57 Karaganov et al., EU-Russia relations, p. 8.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 23Indeed here, it is worth noting the influence of Russian business interests.
Although some have argued that much of Russia’s private sector has a
vested interest in developing ties with the west,59 there was no organised
representation of Russian business interests in Brussels and there is little
unanimity within the Russian business sector about developing relations
with the EU – some companies seek greater interaction with the EU, oth-
ers do not. Moreover, there are those whose interests are not served by the
way the relationship is developing, particularly given the influence of the
EU in formulating the rules and framework of the relationship. This has
not been limited to the energy sector (of which more below). An impor-
tant problem has been the lack of agreement over the restrictions and pay-
ments for the rights to overfly Siberian territory – clearly, Aeroflot had a
financial interest in ensuring that the EU did not achieve its aims.
58 Konstantin Kosachov, “Russian Foreign Policy Vertical”, Russia in Global Affairs, no.
3 (July–September 2004) (online).
59 Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, “America, Russia and Europe: A Realignment?”,
Survival, vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 2002–3): 125.

Chapter 2A Fresh Start?
Relations since 2005
Three problems stand out from the above section – flaws in the decision-
making structures, differences in approach to certain political questions
and the lack of a coherent long-term strategy. This section examines
recent developments, and how the two sides have sought to address these
problems. 60
Some commentators, particularly in Russia, have remained very critical
of the state of the relationship, even asserting a further deterioration.
Victor Mironenko, Chief Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe in
Moscow, considers that relations between Russia and the EU today are
“cooler than ever”, being in a state of “limbo”, “between war and peace”.
He argued that no new ideas or solutions had been introduced at the
summit in May held in Sochi, since neither side had any.61 Yevgeniy
Volk, head of the Heritage Foundation’s Moscow office, noted that
there are “far more problems” in EU-Russia relations at the time of the
May summit in Sochi, even compared with the October summit in Lon-
don.62
Some problems were indeed re-emphasised in 2005, for example at the
beginning of the British presidency of the EU, when an ambiguous
Russian statement following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July
caused some irritation on the British side.63 Other continuing frustra-
tions included the failure to reach agreement on border delineation:
borders between Russia and Estonia and Russia and Latvia – Russia
60 This section is largely based on interviews conducted with officials from both the EU
and Russia in London, Brussels and Moscow in November 2005, February, March
2006.
61 Victor Mironenko, “EU-Russia Summit”, Eurasian Home [Eurasia Heritage Founda-
tion (online)].
62 “Russia’s Putin Hosts EU Leaders: Focused on Energy, Visas”, Mosnews, 25 May 2006
(online).
26 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007pulled out of the agreement with Estonia in early July. And of course
problems in the energy relationship have taken a high profile particu-
larly since January 2006.
Nonetheless, since 2005, the relationship has seen a number of
improvements: new projects are being established and implemented,
some of the old problems are being resolved and there is a new structure
to the relationship. Thus in 2005 the Luxembourg (January until June)
and UK (1 July until 31 December) presidencies of the EU Council
were officially considered by both sides to have a positive impact on the
relationship. One official on the EU side noted that the UK presidency
represented a “fairly high note”, with good outcomes, agreements and
positive language. This improvement was not lost despite the “big
knock” of the gas crisis in January, he stated, since both sides under-
stood the importance of relations more clearly.64 
The Four Road Maps of the Four Common Spaces, which represent the
ongoing work initiated at the 2003 St Petersburg EU-Russia summit,
were finally agreed and signed in May 2005 and illustrate the more real-
istic and systemic approach both sides have adopted. The Road Maps,
as noted above, have been criticised for being vague and a “weaker and
fuzzier derivative of the [EU’s] Neighbourhood policy: they do not
inform us about the future direction of the relationship”. It is “mani-
festly not true”, averred Michael Emerson, senior research fellow at the
Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels and former EU ambassa-
dor to Russia, “that the parties reached agreement on the most difficult
elements”.65 And indeed the document is full of statements of the vague
aims to “explore”, “promote”, “cooperate” (but not specifically how),
“develop” and “consider”.
Even so, the Road Maps do offer a broad framework for the development
of every dimension of the relationship. Moreover, they also include a
number of concrete commitments both to agree to conclude negotia-
tions on certain issues, such as the nuclear safety and security and visa
agreements, and to develop cooperative projects. Other commitments
include the demarcation of borders between EU member states and
63 Vladimir Putin’s statement in response to the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July,
while expressing sympathy for the victims of the attacks, blurred the differences in
approach in pursuing the war on terror and made reference to “double standards” – a
reference to criticism of Russia’s counter-terrorist measures. Embassy of the Russian
Federation in Great Britain, Press release, no. 14, 7 July 2005, Gleneagels, unofficial
translation from Russian (online). 
64 Interview with official, London, August, 2006.
65 Michael Emerson, EU-Russia: Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy,
CEPS Policy Brief, no. 71 (May 2005). 
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 27Russia and to implement the joint statement on the fight against ter-
rorism that the parties adopted at the EU-Russia summit in November
2002 and to sign, ratify and implement UN and Council of Europe con-
ventions on corruption and strengthen existing activities in non-prolif-
eration and disarmament by coordinating EU and Russian positions at
the 2005 NPT Review Conference.66 There is also a commitment to
conclude a standing framework on legal and financial aspects to facili-
tate possible cooperation in crisis management operations.
The Road Maps also aim to add a more developed political dimension
to the legal foundations of the PCA. Most importantly, they are consid-
ered by officials on both sides to be an opportunity to start the relation-
ship afresh – the most important “commitment” is to the new frame-
work of relations, according to one official on the EU side.67
Within the Road Maps framework, a number of cooperative projects
have been, or are being established. The EU is contributing financially
to a number of joint projects. The Commission, allocating 3 million
euros, financed up to 50 per cent of the set-up and running costs of the
European Studies Institute which was established as part of the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations from September 2006. The
EU has also re-emphasised its commitment to widening the scope of
EU-Russia cooperation in a number of socio-economic development
projects. It has allocated 25 million euros to support Kaliningrad’s
development in 2006 and a similar amount to fund cross-border coop-
eration.68
Perhaps more significantly, given the long disagreements over the issue,
there is cooperation to assist the socio-economic development of the
north Caucasus. An EU investigation mission visited the region in
April 2005 and the EU allocated 20 million euros for investment in the
region. Other cooperative projects include support for social rehabilita-
tion and integration, for instance the project for social integration of
disabled people in the Privolzhky Federal Okrug, established in July
2005 and due to run until December 2007.69
66 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
67 Interviews with EU and Russian officials, Brussels, London and Moscow, June and
July 2005.
68 European Commission, “Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner to Visit Moscow on 9
November”, Press Release, 7 November 2005 (online).
69 “Social Integration of Disabled People in Privolzhsky Federal Okrug” [Bernard Brun-
hes International (online 15 June 2006)].
28 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007Other cooperative projects have been established to coordinate export
control of dual use items (goods and technology which are developed for
civilian use but which can be used for military applications or to pro-
duce weapons of mass destruction (WMD)). A launch meeting for the
EU-funded project was held on 18 May 2006. The project seeks to pro-
mote the exchange of information and good practice between Russian
and European export control authorities and deal with regulatory,
licensing implementation and enforcement aspects of export control.
The project, which is due to run until 2009, has a budget of 3 million
euros and is expected to contribute to the fight against the proliferation
of WMD and related materials, equipment and technologies.70
In February, a cooperative project called Interpol Network Modernisa-
tion to tackle organised crime was launched. The EU is providing 3
million euros to fund a project which will run through to 2008 to assist
the modernisation of electronic police communications systems
throughout Russia. The project seeks to enable the expansion of Russian
access to Interpol’s global police communications system’s database,
known as I-24/7, from the Interpol National Central Bureau in Moscow
to regional branches throughout the country and to the General Prose-
cutor’s Office. The project is designed to continue assistance to the Rus-
sian Federation’s Ministry of Interior within the framework of the
Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on Combat-
ing Organised Crime adopted in 2000 by the European Council.71
Long-term problems are also being dealt with. Agreement was achieved
on easing the visa regulations and readmission during the UK presi-
dency in 2005 and signed at the presidential summit in Sochi on 25
May 2006. This takes a major step towards resolving a long-standing
problem and it should be ratified by the end of 2006. It reduces the cost
and bureaucracy for those with valid reasons for frequent travel. The EU
is contributing to Russian border infrastructure and passport security
initiatives. Russia is working to improve its porous southern borders.
70 European Commission, “EU and Russia set to work together on export control of dual
use items”, The European Commission’s Delegation to Russia (online).
71 European Commission: “EU supports modernisation of Interpol’s electronic police
communications network in Russia”, EU & Russia Update, 22 February 2006 [Dele-
gation of the European Commission to Russia (online)]. During its presidency, the
UK sought to develop cooperation in countering organised crime, focusing on the
resurrection of the Organised Crime Action Plan of June 2000. London sought to
cross-reference the Action Plan with the Road Maps to determine areas of continuing
mutual interest. Areas identified included cooperation against trafficking in humans
and drugs and hi-tech crime.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 29Improved Dialogue and Decision-making
Most importantly, the overall structure of the relationship is working
more efficiently. The sub-committees which formed the basic working-
level structure of the relationship have been replaced by specialised
“mini dialogues”, which officials on both sides consider to be more
effective, particularly in the economic road map, because they establish
direct links between relevant actors. These highly technical dialogues
include exchanges on energy, technical regulations, product standards,
intellectual property, transport and investment.72
The PPC format is now working more effectively, breaking the relation-
ship down into more manageable parts. The meetings are now between
the appropriate authorities, enhancing their effectiveness. They are also
less repetitive, since they introduce new contacts with specific and pos-
itive vested interests in making cooperation effective. Although they
remain essentially a mix between ad hoc and regular arrangements, PPCs
have begun to meet with increasing frequency to discuss foreign policy,
justice and home affairs and energy.73
The energy PPC in October 2005 in particular provided a positive stim-
ulus to the development of the EU-Russia energy dialogue. Although
led by senior officials on both sides, and despite the establishment of a
technology centre in Moscow in November 2002 and numerous “work-
ing groups”, positive measures emanating from the dialogue remained
marginal, and the dialogue was delayed by differing interpretations and
priorities. Russia sought support to modernise its energy sector and
protect itself, while the EU sought reform and the opening of the Rus-
sian market through the creation of a positive business climate.74
The UK presidency therefore sought to prioritise the energy dialogue
and add new dynamism to it. Plans and aims were agreed and a frame-
work for the achievement of these plans established at a PPC meeting
on 3 October 2005. This imbued the dialogue with more structure,
broadening it to include a wider set of interlocutors with vested inter-
ests, including greater involvement from business and political author-
ities from both Russia and the EU (previously the dialogue had been
dominated by bureaucrats). These are represented in four thematic
groups, focusing on investment, infrastructure, trade and energy effi-
72 Interviews with EU and Russian officials in Moscow and Brussels, March 2006.
73 PPCs in foreign policy/external security and JHA have become regular biannual
events. The energy PPC remains ad hoc, although the aim is to convert this into a
regular arrangement because of its evident importance.
74 Dov Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, p. 65. In fact, as Lynch points out, both sides are
demandeurs in the negotiations.
30 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007ciency.75 More PPCs were conducted during the Austrian and Finnish
Presidencies, in energy relations, internal security and foreign policy.
Both sides consider the PPCs to be working effectively and seek to have
this arrangement developed further in the future, particularly in the
plans for a replacement document for the PCA. Compared to Russian
objections in 2004 to the format of the meetings, noted above, an
improvement in Russian views of the PPC format is evident. Stanislav
Osdachii, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Rus-
sian Federation to Austria, stated that “these formats have good poten-
tial for the future”. Relations, “virtually in their entirety”, are being
actively transferred to this new basis and “sectoral dialogues, built into
the PPC system, are being promoted. Experience in ongoing dialogues
shows that this mechanism is an optimal and highly effective instru-
ment of furthering cooperation with the EU”, he argued.76
Such improvements have facilitated dialogue in the external and inter-
nal security common spaces. There have been close contacts at ministe-
rial level to discuss cooperation in counter-terrorism. Furthermore, one
of the Austrian presidency’s key goals was achieved with the com-
mencement of EU-Russia-US joint dialogue in internal security. The
first meeting was held on 4 May 2006, on the margins of the Vienna
Ministerial Conference on Security Partnership. Discussions focused on
terrorism, including terrorist financing and recruitment and radicalisa-
tion, organised crime, trafficking of drugs and humans and countering
illegal migration through the security of identity documentation and
improved border control. An expert meeting followed in the autumn
and a formal meeting will take place in the first half of 2007.77
Finally, three human rights consultations have taken place since March
2005. These consultations, to be sure, remain in their infancy and prob-
lems exist. One Russian official considered that the EU press release fol-
lowing the meeting in October was “arrogant”. Equally, an official on
the EU side noted that the second human rights consultation meeting
was less successful, since Russia adopted a more combative and less dis-
cursive stance than in the first meeting. That the deputy head of the
75 European Commission, “Joint EU Presidency and European Commission Press release
on the EU – Russia Permanent Partnership Council on Energy, 3 October 2005, Lon-
don”, External Relations (online).
76 Stanislav Osdachii, “Austria’s EU Presidency and Russia-EU Relations”, International
Affairs, Moscow, no. 3 (2006).
77 Council of the European Union, EU Multi-Presidency – Russian Federation – United Sta-
tes of America meeting at ministerial level communiqué, Vienna, 4 May 2006 [Europees
Bureau (online)].
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 31Russian delegation represented Russia was considered to show that
Russia had downgraded these meetings already. (Russian officials
claimed that the meeting was a success and was “correct”.) There are
also concerns on the EU side about how Russia seeks to handle these
meetings. The MID represents Russia, but the EU side wants to include
other Russian ministries. Russia has resisted this, and also resisted
allowing the meetings to take place in Moscow. Moreover, there are
concerns on the EU side that Russia seeks to downgrade the importance
of these consultations and water them down.78
Nonetheless, both sides have been essentially positive about these con-
sultations, which provide a de-politicised forum for more open and
developed discussion of human rights issues, which have until now been
ignored or merely exchanges of accusations. One expert noted that these
meetings, therefore, represented an effort to discuss subjects which are
usually swept under the carpet.79 Indeed, although it remains a highly
problematic issue, as discussed below, even Chechnya is now being dis-
cussed in a more constructive way. Importantly, although the Austrians
consulted Russian NGOs so that their input could be considered, the
meetings are conducted without media or NGOs present. The dialogue
remains confidential in an effort to seek constructive discussion without
embarrassing each other.80
The third meeting, held in March 2006, this time attended by the head
of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Parshikov, Director for Humani-
tarian Cooperation and Human Rights at the MID, also addressed coop-
eration in UN human rights forums, particularly the mandate and
establishment of the Human Rights Council and preparations for a next
session on the UN Commission on Human Rights. There was also
extensive discussion about the situation of NGOs in Russia and human
rights defenders following the adoption in Russia of the legislation on
NGOs. The EU answered Russian questions about human rights abuses
in the EU, and the sides discussed the issue of brutality and abuse in the
Russian military, with Russia informing the EU about planned meas-
ures to enhance human rights protection in the armed forces. Measures
to combat racism and xenophobia in both the EU and Russia were also
discussed.81
78 Interviews with EU and Russian officials, London, Moscow and Brussels, November
2005, March, August 2006.
79 Interviews with EU and Russian officials in London, Brussels and Moscow, Novem-
ber 2005, March 2006. See also Secretary of State Winkler’s remarks to the European
Parliament, 18 January 2006.
80 Interview with EU official, March 2006.
32 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007Each side has also sought to improve its ability to develop the relation-
ship. Russia has strengthened its mission to the EU, appointing an
ambassador to Brussels in summer 2005, Vladimir Chizhov (formerly a
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), and increasing the size and
improving the structure of the delegation. Although there were con-
cerns on the EU side that such changes might in fact impede the devel-
opment of the relationship – Chizhov was a strong critic of the New
Neighbourhood plan – EU officials have considered him so far to be a
positive influence and interlocutor.82
Following the reassessments of 2004, the EU has sought greater unity
and efficiency in its approach to the former Soviet Union and neigh-
bourhood, including Russia of course, by replacing the TACIS pro-
gramme and improving the mechanism for funding projects. From
2007, substantial changes will be introduced to regional aid to Russia
in the shape of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI). This seeks to simplify the bureaucracy for funding and
project implementation procedures, particularly by establishing clear
criteria and quotas for funding allocation, and will mean a significant
increase in funding for regions bordering the EU, including Russia.83
Officials on both sides pointed out therefore that relations are improv-
ing, there is “less malaise” in the relationship, and that practical
progress is being made “step by step”.84 The steps are small, but a new
beginning is being established.
Ongoing Problems in Decision-making
Practical progress in the relationship remains sporadic, nonetheless, and
of a highly technical nature. A recent evaluation by the European Court
of Auditors found that of 29 TACIS projects completed by the end of
2003 in Russia, 12 had not achieved their objectives at all, and only 5
were sustainable. The court therefore found that although the dialogue
and cooperation between the Court and the Accounts Chamber of the
Russian Federation was rewarding, the effectiveness of TACIS funds in
these projects was very low.85
81 European Commission, “Press Statement: EU/Russia Human Rights Consultations
(Vienna, 3 March 2006)”, 6 March 2006 [The European Commissions Delegation to
Russia (online)].
82 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, March 2006.
83 Lankina, “Explaining …”: 330–1.
84 Interviews with EU and Russian officials, Moscow and Brussels, March 2006.
85 European Court of Auditors, Press Statement by Jacek Uckiewicz, ECA/06/07, Brussels,
20 April 2006 (online). 
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 33Moreover, despite the progress on some of the “irritant” issues on which
the parties have previously failed to reach mutually satisfactory consen-
sus, such as Russia’s WTO membership and visa regulations, there is
limited progress on others, such as the Siberian overflights issue. The
EU maintains that the Russian system of charging European Commu-
nity air carriers overflight payments to cross Russian territory is an
obstacle to the establishment of a constructive transport partnership
and in breach of Russian trade obligations and commitments. The EU
seeks the progressive reduction of such payments from 2006 and the
abolition of payments and restrictions for flight between Europe and
Asia over Russian territory by the end of 2013. Indeed, this may even
re-open old irritants – the EU has stated that Russia’s acceptance of the
EU’s position to be a prerequisite for Russian entry into the WTO.86 
Despite the improvement in structure, problems in the decision-making
chains on both sides still affect the implementation of projects. The EU
has two continuing problems in formulating policy towards Russia.
First, there is consensus among experts on both sides that the EU is dis-
tracted by other, higher priorities, particularly internal institutional
reforms such as the work on the constitution and development and man-
agement of the enlargement process.
Furthermore, although there is greater awareness of the lack of a coher-
ent policy on the EU side, there are still problems. In a recent survey of
EU experts, some 70 per cent of respondents felt that EU member states
still put national interests first in their dealings with Russia, rather than
supporting a consistent EU position. EU institutions thus have made lit-
tle progress in their efforts to achieve common positions towards Russia.
58 per cent believed that the efforts of the EU institutions to promote a
consistent EU position above national interests have hardly, if at all,
intensified. Germany and France were considered particularly at fault for
pursuing their national interests.87
This partly reflects the diversity of interests within the EU, which
continues to both undermine coherence and slow progress down. There
is clearly a greater urgency for states with common borders or for those
which depend significantly on Russia for energy imports, such as
86 Council Conclusions on Siberia, 2721st Transport, Telecommunications and Energy
Council Meeting, Brussels, 27 March 2006. In fact, agreement was reached on this
issue at the Helsinki Summit in November 2006. From 2013, EU airlines will no
longer have to pay Aeroflot fees for flying over Siberia. Fees will be capped at the cur-
rent level until 2010 and reduced thereafter.
87 EU-Russia Centre, The EU and Russia: Perspectives on a Strategic Partnership: Expert Opi-
nion Survey, report, Brussels: May 2006 (online), p. 2.
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states simply have different priorities. Western European states, such as
the UK, Spain and Portugal, for instance, have energy relationships
with other producers and transit states to which to attend. Equally,
while the new eastern European members have a common border with
Russia and therefore a very immediate relationship with it, southern
European states place greater focus on relations with northern Africa.
Such differences are enhanced by divisions within the Union about how
to approach Russia. There are essentially two camps in the EU – those
states considered more friendly towards Russia, such as France,
Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece who seek a good
relationship with Russia, particularly to enhance business relations, and
those which are more critical and demanding of Russia. Currently this
latter group is rather large – and growing. It includes the Netherlands,
Denmark, Ireland and most of the new eastern and central European
member states (indeed it was during the Danish and Dutch Presidencies
that relations really soured) and tends to dominate current priority
issues across the board, although it is currently more visible in security
and JHA issues.88
There is in fact a paradoxical view in Russia of the role of the EU in the
relationship. Although there are those who argue that the EU is in sys-
temic crisis following the rejection of the constitution, and therefore
less able to pursue the relationship effectively,89 there are also those who
argue that the EU is taking advantage of Russia’s negotiating weakness
and pressing a position which runs counter to Russian interests and the
interests of partnership.
On the Russian side, although the PPCs are beginning to broaden the
range of actors involved, the relationship is still essentially driven by the
Presidential Administration, because the President dominates all
aspects of the decision-making process in Russia (the Presidential Rep-
resentative is also present at PPC meetings). Although in some ways
positive, this reliance on one key institution slows down the practical
development of the relationship. Moreover, if it relies on the direct
involvement of the highest person, it is difficult to maintain active
progress across a wide range of issues. Finally, and importantly given
88 Andrew Monaghan, “From Plans to Substance: EU-Russia Relations During the UK
Presidency”, in Understanding Russia and the New Independent States: Russie.NEI.Visions
2006, eds. Thomas Gomart and Tatiana Kastueva-Jean (Paris: IFRI, 2006).
89 Timofei Bordachyov, “EU Crisis: What Opportunities for Russia?”, Rus-
sie.NEI.Visions, no. 7 (Paris: IFRI, October 2005).
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 35the elections due in the next two years, it renders the structure fragile –
at the time of writing, President Putin does not seem likely to be Rus-
sian president after 2008 and who will replace him and with what pri-
orities in either domestic or foreign policies remains unclear.
There is concern on the EU side that although there was agreement at
the top level on issues such as Chechnya and Moldova, discussions
became more difficult further down the decision-making chain and that
the Russian bureaucracy is trying to roll back the President’s forward
position on such issues. Although the Presidential Administration car-
ries weight as an important element of the Russian decision-making
chain, therefore, problems remain. The MID does not seem to carry
enough influence in the decision-making structure to satisfactorily ful-
fil its role as a coordinator of relations. Indeed, there are concerns that
fighting for influence amongst Russian ministries has meant that where
a ministry is not directly involved in the decision-making process, it
seeks to block progress. Thus experts on the EU side note problems
with the coordination of Russian positions and particularly the commit-
ment of the MID to enhancing the relationship. The MID is not consid-
ered to be an effective coordinator, “oiling the wheels” of the relation-
ship between the relevant Russian ministries and the EU. Thus the
different agendas proposed by various Russian Ministries are ineffi-
ciently coordinated and proposed to the EU and therefore cannot be
effectively developed. Moreover, it means that there is little chance that
information will spread back out to the relevant ministries after agree-
ments to develop progress in any policy areas, including security.
Second, the MID is perceived as an intractable partner, at times adopt-
ing an adversarial and point-scoring approach to negotiations. Russian
priorities are often delivered late to the EU, leaving very little time to
develop the detail of a proposal and convert the proposal into substance.
(EU experts note that this perceived approach is contributing to
increasing frustration on the EU side and the growth of the “Russia real-
ist” group). Implementation of agreements therefore remains slow.90
Differences of principle
More significantly, perception and policy differences exist. Although
Javier Solana reiterated in May 2006 that the relationship is a strategic
partnership “based on shared values and shared interests”,91 values dif-
ferences clearly continue. Following its review of EU-Russia relations in
90 Interviews with EU officials, October 2005.
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remain the basis for relations. Concerns over political developments
which demonstrate the discriminatory application of the law or non-
respect of human rights should be “vigorously and coherently” raised by
the EU.92 The EU thus continues to demand that Russia obey the rules
of a club it cannot join and Russian authorities claim their adherence to
these values which they have no current intention to implement. Sir
Roderic Lyne, former British ambassador to Moscow, noted that until
the middle of 2003, it could credibly be argued that the EU and Russia
were moving towards a strategic partnership based on common values.
This is no longer the case, he argued, and value systems are diverging
rather than converging. Therefore cooperation remains limited to spe-
cific interests where Russia and the EU have decided that it is in their
interests to cooperate.93 This suggests a certain weakness – a relation-
ship based on specific common interests rather than common values is
vulnerable to changing interests. The lack of a common underpinning
of values means that the relationship may lack the resilience to with-
stand setbacks and downturns.94
Human Rights and Democracy
Concerns about human rights abuses remain high on the EU’s agenda in
its relations with Russia, despite the progress noted above. Essentially,
while the EU seeks to support a vibrant civil society, it believes that
the Russian state does not. In January 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner,
European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy, presented a censorious speech to the European Parlia-
ment about human rights conditions in Russia, particularly in Chechnya.
Noting the elections in Chechnya, an apparent improvement in the secu-
rity situation there and the stated commitment of Russia to cooperate
with the UN human rights mechanisms, Ferrero-Waldner remained crit-
ical about real progress being made. She stated that a “culture of impunity
remains”, that Russia’s stated commitments needed to be put into prac-
tice and Russia should ensure that the local ombudsman in Chechnya was
seen to be carrying out his duties impartially and effectively. Although
the EU seeks to play its part in the region, there are concerns about the
91 Olga Golovanova, interview with Javier Solana for Interfax News Agency, 23 May
2006 [European Council (online 19 July 2006)].
92 European Commission, Communication from the Commission …, p. 4.
93 Sir Roderic Lyne, “Russia at the Crossroads – Again?”, The EU-Russia Review, no. 1
(Brussels: The EU-Russia Centre, 2006): 10.
94 Bobo Lo makes a similar point in analysing Sino-Russian relations: Bobo Lo, “The
Strange Case of Sino-Russian Relations”, in Understanding Russia …, eds Gomart and
Kastueva-Jean, p. 81.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 37difficulties faced by NGOs receiving support from the EU, including the
Russian-Chechen Friendship Society in Nizhni-Novgorod and in the
European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) programmes.
The Commission has also expressed concerns about the amendments to
Russian legislation on NGOs, particularly that some of the “provisions
are too far-reaching”, especially regarding the denial of registration to
local NGOs and the controls to be exerted on local and foreign NGOs.
Ferrero-Waldner noted that the Commission would take all appropriate
occasions to inform the Russian authorities of its concerns, including
the human rights consultations.95 The EU has also stated its concerns
about the dangers faced by journalists in Russia of late. In the wake of
several killings this year, it stated that a strong commitment on the part
of the authorities to protect journalists from murderous violence is
needed.96 The EU will not simply renounce its support for human rights
in Russia.
However, Russia frequently retorts with accusations that the EU is pur-
suing double standards on human rights issues. Putin has argued that
the EU’s support for the representation of ethnic minorities in admin-
istrative bodies and authorities, including law enforcement structures,
in the appropriate ratio, was at odds with its actions on its own territo-
ries. When Russia pointed to Riga’s population, of which 60 per cent is
Russian, and suggested introducing the same standards, the EU reply,
he argued, was that the situation is different there. It was, he stated,
“high time to stop mocking common sense”.97 Kosachev also stated that
the events in the autumn of 2005 in France were indications that under-
mined the moral value of what the EU had to say to Russia about its
ethnic policies.98
Finally, the EU has sought to support democratic change and values in
the NIS, which Moscow sees as destabilising and potentially threaten-
ing to Russian interests. Indeed, there is a fundamental disagreement
over the democratic processes in the NIS, particularly in Georgia and
the Ukraine: the EU sees the process as one of democratic “coloured rev-
95 European Parliament, “Chechnya after the elections and civil society in Russia”,
speech by Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the European Parliament, Strasbourg 18
January 2006, speech/06/15 [Europa (online)]. 
96 The Council Presidency (Finland), “OSCE: EU Response to the Representative on
Freedom of the Media”, eu2006.fi [Prime Minister’s Office, Finland (online)]. 
97 Vladimir Putin, “This Year Was Not an Easy One”, International Affairs, Moscow, no.
1 (2005).
98 Konstantin Kosachov, “Russia between European choice and Asian growth”, Interna-
tional Affairs, Moscow, no. 1 (2006).
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ported by external forces.
Energy Relations
Outside the bureaucratic specifics of the energy dialogue, which both
sides consider to be evolving positively,99 the energy relationship is
beset by a lack of political confidence on both sides, clearly exemplified
by the exchanges since January 2006.100 Concerns in many quarters in
the EU about growing dependence on energy imports from an increas-
ingly authoritarian Russia which might use its control over a large share
of the EU’s energy imports to blackmail the Union have been exacer-
bated by Russian cut-offs to the NIS, particularly to Belarus (2004 and
again in 2007) and the Ukraine (2006), which had a practically small
and short term, but politically significant knock-on impact on the
reserves of several EU member states.
Russia also has concerns: the EU is Russia’s main market. Russian ana-
lysts argue that the European Commission will show maximum resolve
in negotiations to safeguard EU interests.101 According to another ana-
lyst, there are fears in Russia that the EU will seek to exert pressure on
Moscow on the one hand and seek other sources before Russia can
develop other markets. These concerns result in the stoking of fears of
retaliation by Russia if alternative deals are pursued by the EU.102
Diversification, usually considered to be one of the key tenets of
energy security, may therefore begin to undermine the EU-Russia
relationship, as both seek to diversify away from each other in an effort
to enhance their energy security. Again, there is a somewhat conflict-
ing image here on both sides. Senior EU officials have highlighted the
interdependent nature of the relationship, with the EU’s need for a
reliable source of energy and Russia’s need for reliable markets. Senior
Russian officials have also sought to bolster confidence: finance min-
ister Alexei Kudrin stated the need for more pipelines to be built to
99 The European Policy Centre, “EU-Russia: energy security and geopolitics”, seminar
presentations by Jeffery Piper and Konstantin Trofimov, Brussels, 17 March 2006,
Events Report (online).
100 For a more in-depth discussion of this, see Andrew Monaghan, “Russia-EU Relations:
An Emerging Energy Security Dilemma”, Pro & Contra, vol. 10, no. 2–3 (summer
2006) [Carnegie Endowment (online)].
101 Leonid Grigoriev and Anna Chaplygina, “Looking into the Future: The Energy Dia-
logue Between Russia and the European Union”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2
(April–June 2003) (online 13 May 2006).
102 F. Hill, Beyond Co-dependency: European Reliance on Russian Energy, US-Europe Analysis
Series, The Brookings Institution, July 2005.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 39Europe to ensure supply, predominantly against disruption to supply
caused by third parties.103
However, there have also been very high-profile warnings from both
sides. Russia criticised the EU in March 2006 for its double standards
in energy security and rejected its criticism of Gazprom’s actions
towards Ukraine in January as Cold War rhetoric. Subsequently, the
heads of Transneft and Gazprom (Semyon Vainshtok and Alexei
Miller respectively) stated that Russia had overfed Europe with its
resources and should begin to look to other markets in the Far East
and the USA.104 The EU has rejected such statements and Russia’s
more assertive position, in turn warning Gazprom both to stick to its
contractual commitments and against threatening EU energy sup-
plies.105 This has stimulated – once again – calls in the EU for diver-
sity away from Russia: the spokesman for EU Energy Commissioner
Andris Piebalgs, stated that “Gazprom’s statement gives grounds to
our concerns on the growing foreign dependency of European energy
supply and … our need to diversify both the origin of our supplies and
our supply routes”.106
Moreover, there is a key disagreement over the Energy Charter Treaty
(ECT) and its Transit Protocol. During the Austrian presidency, the EU
sought to persuade Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, accord-
ing to Martin Bartenstein, President of the EU Energy Council and
Austria’s Minister of Economics and Labour, “as soon as possible, and
ideally before the summer”.107 A number of senior Russians have
argued, however, that this is simply a dead document. Viktor Khris-
tenko, Russia’s Energy Minister, and President Putin have both stated
that ratifying the charter is out of the question, since it was signed in
different circumstances by a different Russian government. Alexandr
Medevedev, Head of Gazexport, Gazproms’s export business, was also
103 “Russia Seeks More Gas Links to Europe, May Ease Pipeline Access”, Mosnews, 12
February 2006 (online). 
104 “Russia Should Cut Oil to Europe, Cut Discounts on Urals Crude – Transneft”, Mos-
news, 24 April 2006 (online); “Gazprom warns EU not to block its expansion plans,
‘politicise’ supply issues”, AFX News, 20 April 2006 (online). Equally, Miller said
that Gazprom “understood” its responsibility and “will remain the guarantor of
energy security for the European customers”. He added that Gazprom was “able to
satisfy reliably growing gas demand in Europe”, and Gazprom would “faithfully fulfil
all gas contracts with European clients”.
105 “EU warns against Russian gas supply threats”, EU Business, 15 August 2006
(online).
106 “EU warned against dependency on Russian energy”, EUObserver, 21 April 2006
(online).
107 The Council Presidency (Austria), “Bartenstein: EU and Russia Need a New-style
Energy Partnership”, Press Release, 16 March 2006. [Austrian Ministry for Foreign
Affairs (online)].
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“rule that transit should not be mixed with supply” – essentially high-
lighting the complexity of energy relations, going beyond simple “pro-
ducer” and “consumer” relations to include transit states: producers are
not solely responsible for production and transit supply.108 Russian
experts also argue that the ECT highlights the inequality of the rela-
tionship, being illustrative of “European egotism”: it is one-sided and
unfair since it forces Russia to implement EU internal rules.109
The Shared Neighbourhood and Unequal Cooperation
There are also problems in the shared neighbourhood, where there is
only a modest record of cooperation in the region despite common
interests in dealing with issues such as migration (legal and illegal),
organised crime and trafficking, and poverty and corruption. Further-
more, the security agenda in four of the six states in the shared neigh-
bourhood is dominated by the so-called “frozen” conflicts in Georgia,
Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh.110 These conflicts are complex and
have a mix of ethnic, political and economic origins. In Georgia, sepa-
ratist regimes have established themselves in two areas – South Ossetia
and Abkhazia – and resisted efforts by Tbilisi to re-establish control.
Both territories seceded following the collapse of the USSR. Georgian
forces entering Abkhazia in an attempt to restore Georgian territorial
integrity were repulsed. A cease-fire agreement was reached in May
1994, and Russian peacekeepers deployed in June. In South Ossetia,
fighting lasted until a cease-fire was agreed June 1992, also followed by
a peacekeeping mission led by Russia. Moldovan independence from
the USSR challenged the Transdnistrian political predominance, and
the leadership feared that Moldova would seek to reunify with Roma-
nia. Violent clashes reached a peak in June 1992, since when a Russian-
led peacekeeping operation has been deployed. Clearly Russian forces
have played a major role in the conflicts as peacekeepers in all three
areas. However, there are concerns on the EU side that Russia has used
its military presence to maintain its own influence there rather than act
108 Carl Mortished and Jeremy Page, “Gazprom Accuses EU of Double Standards and
Naivety”, Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, vol. 11, no. 7 (online 5 Apr 2006).
109 Interview with Vladimir Milov, President of the Institute for Energy Security, March
2006.
110 Andrei Zagorski, “Russia and the Shared Neighbourhood”, in What Russia Sees, ed.
Lynch, p. 63. For an in-depth examination of these conflicts, see Dov Lynch, Engaging
Eurasia’s Separatist States. Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States. (Washington D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004). Lynch maintains that these conflicts are
in fact not “frozen” but “dynamic”, since much has taken place since these conflicts
began over a decade ago, and any move towards resolving them must take this into
account. pp. 7–8.
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drawal of Russian forces.
Although Russia has officially welcomed EU participation as an
observer in the 5-sided talks seeking a solution to the Transdnistria con-
flict,111 the sides differ over how to approach the conflicts, particularly
in Moldova/Transdnistria and in Georgia. Moscow blamed the EU for
the Moldovan rejection of a unilateral Russian proposal (the Kozak Mem-
orandum – since the proposal was led by Putin’s envoy Dmitri Kozak) in
2003. Russia sees EU statements about the need for a multilateral
approach to resolving the conflict as an attempt to weaken Russian
influence and increase that of the EU – essentially that the conflict rep-
resents part of a wider European context of increasing EU influence and
bringing about Russian withdrawal.112 There were further concerns in
Moscow about the EU’s unilateral move to establish border observation
missions in Transdnistria. Moscow therefore argues that EU policy in
the area is negatively affecting Russia’s relations with the states, and
considers the new EU-supported border observation mission in
Moldova tantamount to a blockade on Transdnistria.113
For its part, on the EU side there are both doubts about Moscow’s sin-
cerity in seeking a solution to these conflicts and also concerns that
Moscow no longer supports the principle of territorial integrity in the
South Caucasus, particularly in Georgia.114 Presidential statements give
this some credence. Putin has stated that Russia proceeded from a posi-
tion of Georgian territorial integrity, and that issues such as the ongo-
ing disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be settled by
negotiation, taking the interests of all the peoples living on the territory
into account. However, he has also compared the situation to that of the
former Yugoslavia and the de facto secession of Kosovo, and stated that
Russia would be prepared to be close and support Abkhazian economic
development.115 This divergence of views seems likely to affect cooper-
ation on conflict resolution in Georgia, should Moscow support South
Ossetia’s secession.
111 European Commission: “Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner …”
112 Dov Lynch, “Shared Neighbourhood or New Frontline? The Crossroads in Moldova”,
in Understanding Russia and the New Independent States: Russie.NEI.Visions 2006, eds
Thomas Gomart and Tatiana Kastueva-Jean (Paris: IFRI, 2006), pp. 128–29.
113 Interviews with Russian official, March 2006.
114 For a brief discussion of this, see Mark Smith, Kosovo’s Status: Russian Policy on Unrecog-
nised States, CSRC paper 06/01. (Swindon: Conflict Studies Research Centre, January
2006).
115 Putin, “This Year Was Not an Easy One”.
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Indeed, the PCA itself is seen by some in Russia to perpetuate an une-
qual relationship, treating Russia as a “student” whose progress in the
development of a new society is crucial for relationship with the
“teacher” – the EU. The PCA is “full of phrases which point at inequal-
ities between the two parties, and which put Russia into the position
not of an equal, but as the securer of the EU’s interests”. They argue that
Russia needs therefore to seek greater involvement and more developed
consultation in decision-making in the relationship on issues which
affect Russian interests, and thus become a “policy-maker” rather than
a “policy-taker”.116 Russia still does not however, seek to be fully inte-
grated into the EU’s multilateral framework, instead attempting to for-
mulate policy positions which correspond to the status of a regional or
great power, while the EU prefers to guard its decision-making auton-
omy and meet Russia in the “troika” ministerial format.117
The issue of equality particularly affects cooperation in crisis management
in two ways. First, Russia does not accept the idea that the “frozen” con-
flicts or crises to be managed are only on the territory of the former USSR.
Russia wants to be involved in Cyprus, but the EU considers this to be an
internal EU matter, and will not discuss it with Russia.
Second, Moscow maintains that the EU should show willingness to
include Russia as an equal rather than simply an observer or junior part-
ner. Moscow wants to be involved in command and planning. The EU
however, according to Chizhov, is “only ready to offer a scenario
whereby the EU makes the decisions on the conduct of peacekeeping
operations while relegating Russia to observer status”. “Our coopera-
tion on such a basis will flounder … unless we can agree on an accepta-
ble format for crisis management operations that takes into account the
interests of all participants”, he stated.118 Thus, although Russia con-
tributed on a small scale (5 militia men) to the EU police mission to
Bosnia Herzegovina, Moscow has rejected EU offers to join other mis-
sions. Indeed, reflecting its disappointment in the situation, Moscow is
not replacing its commitment to the Bosnia Herzegovina mission,
which is being decommissioned.119 Military cooperation in crisis man-
agement seems to remain some distance in the future, in part blocked
116 On the Eve of Finland’s Presidency …, p. 4.
117 Sven Hirdman, Russia’s Role in Europe (Moscow: Carnegie Centre, 2006), p. 14.
118 Vladimir Chizhov, “Russia-EU Cooperation: The Foreign Policy Dimension”, Inter-
national Affairs, Moscow, no. 5 (2005).
119 According to one Russian official, the original deployment of 5 militiamen had been
reduced to two for “technical” rather than political reasons. However, the decision not
to replace them was more political. Interview, Moscow, March 2006.
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management operations which are very complex and restrictive. Russia
might be asked to contribute forces but would be unlikely to receive a
special command role.
In sum, there are a number of serious principal differences between the
two partners, and although there is an improvement in the overall struc-
ture of the relationship, they approach certain questions from polar
opposite positions – the benefits of democracy in the former Soviet
Union, the importance of territorial integrity in dealing with the “fro-
zen” conflicts, inequalities in the relationship, the validity of the ECT
– that remain and are even growing in the relationship. This leads to
the next issue, the ongoing lack of clear strategic plans for the develop-
ment of the relationship.
Lack of Shared Strategic Vision
Although the road maps provide an agenda for short-to-medium term
cooperation (officials hope that the important elements of them will be
completed in three years), there is no commonly developed strategy for
the long-term evolution of the relationship. This is in part because, as
noted above, both sides have internal issues which distract attention
from the development of the relationship. Neither side has a clear image
of its own development in strategic terms, which affects the planning of
the strategic development of the relationship. The lack of a common
vision – or even of substantial discussion of further integration or Rus-
sian membership of the EU – undermines the ability to form a coherent
legal basis for the relationship.120
The key legal document remains the PCA, which is due for renewal in
2007. The PCA can be automatically prolonged on a yearly basis unless
one party disagrees (during the Austrian presidency agreement was
reached with Russia that Russia would not disagree and therefore that
the PCA would continue until a new document was finalised). But there
are concerns that without a new agreement the relationship lacks a solid
legal foundation and that the PCA has ceased to be an adequate docu-
ment for the development of the relations. Simply relying on the annual
extension does not provide a real solution, since with the passage of
120 New members are not invited to join the EU, but must apply. After that, the EU will
decide whether to begin entry negotiations. It currently seems that Russia, keen to
emphasise its role as a major intercontinental player, would be unlikely to place itself
in such a supplicant position to the EU.
44 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007time, it will simply depart further from the reality of content and forms
of relations and will become completely irrelevant.121
The need for an updated document has been noted by top officials on
both sides. Both President Putin and Javier Solana have emphasised the
importance of an up-to-date and modern legal base to develop the rela-
tionship to reflect the changes in the EU and Russia: Russia is now a dif-
ferent country, in effect, and in the process of joining the WTO; the EU’s
enlargement and consolidation of its Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy means that a new contract is needed to deepen the relationship.122
Some formal progress is taking place. At the EU-Russia Summit on 25
May 2006 leaders agreed to develop a new agreement to replace the
PCA. The Commission suggested that the new agreement cover the
large area of cooperation built up in the intervening years, set out in the
Road Maps adopted at the summit in May 2005. The Commission
approved terms for draft negotiating directives on the 3 July 2006. The
official statement noted that the Commission wants the new agreement
to be based on recognition of common values such as democracy, human
rights and the rule of law. The Commission hopes the agreement will
adopt ambitious objectives on political and external security coopera-
tion, effective multilateralism, provisions on the fight against organised
crime, WMDs, migration and asylum, and counter-terrorism. In partic-
ular, the Commission wants to consolidate the EU-Russia energy rela-
tionship based on reciprocity, fair and equal access and a level playing
field, and to promote further development of EU-Russia trade rela-
tions.123
However, given the discussion about principle differences above, such
conditions will be difficult to achieve. This is all the more so because of
the complexities of reaching agreement and since Russia wants the new
document to include and reflect Russia’s new WTO membership,
which is therefore likely to delay the process further. Thus some experts
on the EU side believe that the new document might not be ready until
2009, although they noted the possibility that some part of the docu-
ment, such as energy relations, might be agreed and implemented
before the final package was agreed.124 
121 Yuri Borko, “Rethinking Russia-EU Relations”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 3 (July–
September 2004) (online 13 December 2005).
122 Golovanova, interview with Javier Solana …
123 European Commission, “European Commission Approves Terms for Negotiating
New EU-Russia Agreement” Press Release, IP/06/910, Europa (online).
124 Interviews with EU officials, August 2006.
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developing a new document, particularly in the wider Russian body
politic. Chizhov stated before the Sochi summit that Russia is happy to
continue with the PCA since its imperfections are bearable and its
intended successor, a Strategic Partnership Agreement, will require
considerable negotiation to account successfully for all the changes that
have taken place.
There are also those on both sides who do not actively seek to enhance
the relationship. According to Russian experts, this group has grown
considerably with the EU’s enlargement to include the Baltic states.
There are also constituents in Russia who seek to enhance Russia’s posi-
tion as an independent pole in international relations which does not
need an enhanced agreement with the EU. According to one Russian
commentator therefore, the EU and Russia are approaching the discus-
sion about renewing the agreement with a “noticeable lack of interest
toward each other, if not downright irritation”.125
Conclusions: Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better
It is clearly a relationship of strategic importance across all dimensions,
with many common interests. Energy is a priority issue, both in terms
of trade and security, for both partners. Economic relations are also very
important for both parties. Security issues – both military and soft –
have risen to high prominence on the agenda. Project funding frame-
works are also clearly considered important priorities, as indicated by
the reorganisation of TACIS funding. The conclusion therefore, often
presented by experts and officials alike, that each party represents a stra-
tegic horizon for the other seems inescapable.
But how to quantify EU-Russia relations appropriately? It is hardly an
alliance. Although it is problematic, neither is the relationship really
hostile, particularly compared to the Cold War years. It is frequently
depicted, especially in official terms, as a strategic partnership. Yet in
many ways, it is neither “strategic” nor a “partnership”: there is no real
strategic plan for the long term (reflected in the debate over the plans
to replace the PCA, the legal basis for the relationship). Nor is there real
partnership: in too many dimensions, interests are not mutually benefi-
cial or are even in conflict.
125 Timofei Bordachyov, “Toward a strategic alliance”, Russia in Global Affairs, no. 2
(April–June 2006) (online); Nadezhda Arbatova, “Russia-EU Quandary 2007”, Rus-
sia in Global Affairs, no.2 (April–June 2006) (online).
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to trumpet. This is in part because the very breadth of the agenda
makes effective prioritising of issues difficult, even considering the
attempts to do so. If the broadening of the political framework to
include other interlocutors helps, there are problems on both sides
ensuring the consistency of the priority and practical progress in
addressing it – most clearly indicated by the rotating presidency of
the European Council, and the different interests which rise to the top
of the EU agenda (some experts on the EU side have suggested that
Russia was not a particular focus).
In fact, moreover, in some ways, the relationship remains mutually
exclusive: the two sides effectively continue to speak different
languages. As Vladimir Shemyatenkov has noted, the EU and Russia
live their own separate lives. Ordinary citizens have precious little to do
with the relationship, he suggested, meaning that the whole exercise is
reserved for a handful of government officials. It comes as no surprise
therefore that the product of their deliberations is inconsequential. The
best example is the notorious four spaces and road maps, which are
devoid of any rational content ... the development of “positive”
cooperation between Russia and the EU is unsatisfactory because it is
premature.126
Equally, neither side wants to allow the other much influence over its
actions in a cooperative sense. The EU has had very little success in
influencing Russian action in Chechnya through sanctions. Greater
Russian financial independence (due to its energy exports) renders the
use of the EU’s financial carrots less effective. This resistance to each
other causes problems. Russia seeks to avoid isolation by attempting to
establish a relationship with the EU based on equality – yet it considers
EU reticence to involve Russia as an equal as a sign of its growing iso-
lation in and from Europe. On the other hand, the EU is showing
greater assertiveness and beginning to press for greater involvement in
the shared neighbourhood with Russia – or without it if no agreement
can be reached.
Neither are comparisons with other states or organisations flattering.
Some have pointed to the improvement of Russia’s relations with China
and the US, for example, in terms of their agreement on more robust
methods of dealing with the war on terror and the more flexible bureau-
cratic relationship between the US and Russia which causes less fric-
126 Correspondence with this author, October 2006.
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 47tion.127 Many Russians have also pointed to an improvement in relations
with NATO, including the establishment of the NATO-Russia Coun-
cil, while EU-Russia relations have deteriorated. By 2004, some Rus-
sian commentators were therefore suggesting that the old paradigm of
the EU representing the “good west” and NATO the “bad west” was
being reversed.128 Yet the NATO-Russia relationship is also problem-
atic – if the new agenda is fairly positive, old problems have not van-
ished, indeed they may once again be coming to the fore. Russia-US and
Russia-China relations are also problematic, ambiguous and in many
ways insubstantial.129
The EU-Russia relationship should be seen in an appropriate (histor-
ical) context – the conversion of a confrontational relationship such as
that between the USSR and European Communities during the Cold
War into a genuinely cooperative relationship will take more time.
This point is emphasised by the fact that both sides are only really
beginning to formulate coherent foreign policy approaches – on the
EU side this is particularly important given that it is now trying to
formulate policy towards states that do not seek membership, so it
cannot use its usual tools.
Indeed in many ways, the EU-Russia relationship is groundbreaking.
The PCA (at the time of its signing) was the broadest and most com-
prehensive agreement concluded between Russia and any Western
state or organisation, and the CSR and MTS were the first documents
of their kind proclaimed by either side. Many of the agreements under
this umbrella are also the first of their kind. The regular meetings
between the EU COPS and Russia and the signing of the visa accords
are the first of their kind, as was Russia’s contribution to the EU’s
Police Mission. The “efficient cooperation” of auditing the TACIS
projects was the first time in the history of the European Court of
Auditors with a Supreme Audit Institution from a third and non-
member or candidate country.130
Furthermore, the growing frequency of PPC meetings in a number of
dimensions of the relationship and the establishment of the human
127 Stent and Shevtsova, “America, Russia and Europe”, pp. 122, 128.
128 Interviews with Russian experts, Moscow, St Petersburg summer 2005. For an exami-
nation of NATO-Russia relations, see Peter Williams, “NATO-Russia military coo-
peration: From dialogue to interoperability”, RUSI Journal, October 2005.
129 For a recent assessment of Russia-US relations, see Stephen Sestanovich, ed., Russia’s
Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do, Independent Task Force
Report, no.57 (NY: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006); for Sino-Russia rela-
tions, see Lo, “The Strange Case of Sino-Russia Relations”.
130 Statement by Uczkiewicz.
48 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007rights consultations are real steps forward on what have been difficult
issues in the past. The existence of a dense but effective network of con-
nections and developing dialogues is important for the substance of the
relationship. It is neither dynamic nor particularly smooth, but does
provide a platform for a new relationship, and it is still possible to infuse
the relationship with positive political drive by completing projects.
Nonetheless, EU-Russia relations clearly remain longer on dialogue
and shorter on major practical progress. Without the conceptual glue
of coherent strategy to hold the relationship together, moreover, and
without the drive of committed personnel, successes at the operational
level remain fragile and vulnerable to changes in the political wind.
Indeed, it is possible that without the development of this positive
luggage, the relationship may indeed fall into systemic crisis as disap-
pointment again grows, and those who are willing to try again become
fewer and fewer. A negative change in the political wind, whether due
to this disappointment or the emergence of new problems or a new
elite could stall or sour the relationship.131
So although the importance, indeed the necessity of the relationship for
both parties is clear, and progress is being made the problems remain
many and complex. Perhaps, therefore, the words of the play-write Sam-
uel Beckett neatly encapsulate the evolution of EU-Russia relations so
far: “Try again. Fail again. Fail Better”.132
But it is also possible that without the development of this positive lug-
gage, the relationship may indeed fall into systemic crisis as disappoint-
ment again grows, and those who are willing to try again become fewer
and fewer. A negative change in the political wind, whether due to this
disappointment or the emergence of new problems or a new elite could
stall or sour the relationship.
Thus the tension between political vision and bureaucratic progress is
now the central question in the relationship, and therefore, once again,
the relationship reaches an important time. With the overarching lack
of mutual confidence, the relationship is vulnerable to such a change in
the wind, on the one hand if there is pressure from the EU on the values
dimensions in the relationship and on the other depending on changes
in the executive leadership in Russia in 2008. The increasingly forth-
131 Interviews with EU and Russian officials, Brussels, July, October 2005
132 Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, The Samuel Becket On-Line Resources and Links
Pages (online). 
TRY AGAIN, FAIL AGAIN, FAIL BETTER 49right foreign policy positions of both sides and the upcoming elections
in Russia in 2007 and 2008 (in roughly the same timeframe as the re-
negotiation of the PCA and the implementation of the Road Maps)
therefore take on added significance for the long-term development of
EU-Russia relations.
A key problem remains the lack of promotion of the successes and con-
sequently the ongoing lack of awareness of the developments in the rela-
tionship – the focus is very much on its failings. There is, of course,
much to criticise. Yet there is hardly any real analysis of the progress
made, for instance the human rights consultations. In the EU-Russia
centre expert survey noted above, some 64 per cent had not seen evi-
dence that the meetings had taken place, let alone had any impact. A
Latvian academic commented “what meetings?”133 This must change if
the atmosphere of the relationship and the confidence in it on both sides
is to be improved.
In this respect, EU-Russia relations still offer a huge canvas, covering
many dimensions including economics, energy security and trade, pol-
itics, law, military and diplomatic cooperation and so on. And yet there
is a surprising dearth of broad – or deep – research into the subject, and
many questions remain to be addressed. Although a number of topics
are mentioned, they are rarely developed. Almost all post-summit state-
ments refer to discussion of a wide range of international issues of stra-
tegic importance, including Iran, the Balkans, and the Middle East
Peace Process, and the coincidence or harmonious nature of approaches
to these issues. But this needs closer examination. If there is official dis-
cussion on “questions of international importance” such as the Middle
East peace process, then what are the positions? What are the results?
The same can be said of the Russia-“EU 3” talks on the Iranian nuclear
issue. 134 One analyst has noted that Russia joined the European diplo-
matic initiative to persuade Iran to renounce nuclear technology that
could be used for military purposes. Both EU and Russian officials
(including Ferrero-Waldner, Lavrov and Chizhov) have noted the possi-
bilities for cooperation on the issues and brief news reports of such coop-
eration frequently appear, but more in-depth examination is warranted.135
133 EU-Russia Centre Expert survey : 61 % thought that the meetings had resulted in
no, or hardly any, meaningful change, only some 15 % said there had been evidence
of meaningful change. 
134 The EU 3 refers to the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
135 Wagnsson, “The Alien and the Traditional …”, p. 107. See also “Russia Backs EU
Proposal, Urges Iran to Cooperate”, Mosnews, 24 May 2006 (online 25 May 2006).
50 Defence and Security Studies 2-2007As Tomila Lankina, Visiting Woodrow Wilson Fellow at the
Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington
has noted, there is precious little serious examination of the EU’s tech-
nical assistance to Russia. Yet this is an important element of the rela-
tionship. In fact, Lankina’s useful study appropriately raises as many
questions as it answers – if the EU’s funding policy is based on the
support of pluralism and democratic reform, and is facilitated by work
with NGOs, how will this be affected by the domestic political devel-
opments in Russia, particularly the legislation which curbs foreign
funding of Russian NGOs?
The security relationship is another dimension of the relationship rarely
examined in depth. How has cooperation to enhance civil defence devel-
oped? What about other issues, such as dealing with landmines? The
EU plays a large, albeit non-signatory, role in universalising the con-
ventions of the Ottawa Process and Treaty.136 According to one expert,
it seeks to universalise the conventions and urges non-signatories to
adopt the provisions of the treaty by exerting pressure through its in-
country diplomatic staff and lobbying in Brussels. The EU and Russia
have, according to the road map on external security, agreed to enhance
“ongoing work” on threats posed by landmines and old ammunition.137
Yet evidence of Russia using landmines exists, and its refusal to sign up
to the conventions has been a barrier to the EU’s aim of universalisa-
tion.138 Cooperation to enhance non-proliferation must also be exam-
ined in more depth, particularly with regard to the development of the
joint document on strategic partnership.139 More could also be made of
comparative studies of the EU-Russia “strategic partnership” with
those between Russia-US or Russia-China. If there is much to do to
develop the relationship, there is yet more to do to enhance our under-
standing of it and thus contribute to its further development.
136 The Ottawa process culminated in the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty in December
1997, which came into force in September 1998. In brief, it obliges signatories never
to use anti-personnel mines, to abjure their use and destroy stockpiles, and to clear
their territory of them. The EU has a large voice in landmines projects as a large
financial donor.
137 European Commission, Road Map for the Common Space of External Security, annex 3
(online).
138  R. Dover, “The EU’s joint action on anti-personnel mines and unexploded ordnance:
Finding a security policy identity”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, no. 3
(Autumn 2006).
139 European Commission, Road Map for the Common Space …. A useful study on this sub-
ject can be found in Schmitt, ed., EU Cooperative Threat Reduction …, but it is brief,
and needs updating. More should also be made of Russian perspectives of cooperation
in this area.
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